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SOME THOUGHTS ON MINIMAL ENTITLEMENTS
AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
Akhil Reed Amar*
I am first going to address minimal entitlements and then I am
going to move to a related area: child abuse and whether the govern-
ment is compelled to protect children against abuse-i.e., whether
there is a compelling interest t}:1at requires affirmative government
action.
First, about minimal entitlements to a stake in society. Many sen-
sible constitutional ideas can be triangulated different ways. There
are different modes of analysis and ways to get to the same basic
idea, although different paths may have slightly different implica-
tions at the margin. If you take the basic idea of freedom of speech,
for example, we could, even without the First Amendment, think
about freedom of speech both as an aspect of individual liberty, im-
plicating personhood and autonomy-expression as part of what it
means to be an individual in a free society-and as an essential re-
quirement of democratic or collective self-governance. The latter is
the Meiklejohn ideal that regardless of whether each iJ.1dividual has
an inalienable right to speak in say, a benign monarchy, in a working
democracy, the populace must be permitted to exchange views and to
criticize officials in government. We take those basic intuitions, which
converge to a fair degree but diverge at the margins, and we often
talk about these visions by using the rhetoric or the text of the First
Amendment. What I suggest is that there is a similar way we could
think about minimal entitlements. Indeed, we. could root it, I sup-
pose, in a First Amendment ideal, although I am going to suggest
some other ways.
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School. The remarks that follow borrow heavily from two short
articles. See Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal
Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 37 (1990); Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky,
Child Abuse As Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1359 (1992).
1 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN. POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE (1960); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT.
REV. 245.
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Dean Edelman talks about both a Lockean and a Rousseauian (re-
publican) conception of minimal entitlements.2 The Lockean concep-
tion goes to what it means for an individual to be able to survive in
this society-for the individual to have some dignity and a minimal
ability to live. and perhaps even flourish. But, however true that is
generally, I suggest there is another way to think about minimal enti-
tlements. In a democracy, in order for people truly to be citizens in
society they have to have some minimal stake in that collective enter-
prise. They have to be shareholders in U.S.A., Inc. They have to
have, almost literally, some ground of their own on which to stand in
order to resist government tyranny and to be members of society.
Basically, there is a fundamental linkage between property and
democracy.
There are two ways to run that linkage. First is the exclusionary
method: if you 'do not have property you cannot be in the democratic
club. You are excluded because you are not really a full per-
son-maybe because you are an eighteenth century married woman
and you cannot even own real property and in legal contemplation
you do not have any will of your own; maybe because you are a slave;
maybe simply because you do not (even if you are a white male) own
real property and therefore do not have a stake in the societal ven-
ture. The exclusionary side of the republican vision is poll taxes and
the like. That is the original constitutional vision: in order to be a
member of the democratic club you have to have some minimal prop-
erty. Thus, property is prior to democracy in some unfortunate ways.
What I suggest, however, is that there is a different vision that sim-
ply reverses that linkage. This second type of linkage puts democracy
first, and it says that because people are citizens, and they are going
to be voting on issues that are important to us as well as to them, we
must guarantee that they have some minimal stake in society. That
is, I would suggest, the inclusionary vision of republicanism.
Once again, however, I have been talking at a rather high level of
generality as I did with individual and collective interests and free-
dom of speech. But it seems to me that we can give this vision a more
precise foundation based upon particular clauses in the Constitution
and particular historical events that support it, just as the text of the
First Amendment and the historical event of the reaction to the Sedi-
tion Act support the First Amendment tradition. Basically, in a word,
this inclusionary republican vision, with a capital "R" as well as a
• See Peter B. Edelman, Mandated Minimum Income, Judge Posner, and the Destruction of
the Rule of Law, 55 ALB. L. REV. 633 (1992).
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small "r," is, in some respects, the vision of Reconstruction. If I were
pointing to particular constitutional text, I would point to the second
reconstruction in the 1960s, and the Twenty-fourth Amendment,
which abolishes poll taxes.
I would also point to the three amendments of the first Recon-
struction: the Fifteenth, Fourteenth and Thirteenth, working back-
wards. When you think about these three amendments together, they
are basically about reversing the priority of property and democracy
by putting democracy' first. The Fifteenth Amendment makes blacks
(former slaves) voters. The Fourteenth Amendment makes them citi-
zens. And the Thirteenth makes them' free.· There is a linkage be-
tween these amendments. In, order to assure ourselves that former
slaves will sensibly exercise their Fifteenth Amendment right, it is
important to understand that the Thirteenth Amendment is ulti-
mately about freedom and some minimal stake in society-what I am
going to call "forty acres and a mule." We have to read the Thir-
teenth Amendment in light of its subsequent history to understand it
as part of the opening act of what my colleague Bruce Ackerman calls
"a constitutional moment."
When legal commentators look at this constitutional moment, I
think they have a basic intuition that this idea of minimal entitle-
ment is significantly connected to Reconstruction, but different com-
mentators try to locate that vision in the text of different clauses of
the Constitution. Many try to make arguments based on due process.
For example, Dean Edelman talked a lot about life, liberty, and prop-
erty, resonating with the Due Process Clause,3 and some of Professor.
Grey's work in response to Goldberg u. Kelley· has focused on the
'Due Process Clause as one way to think about minimal entitlements. Ii
I think there are some problems with this and that the Due Pro-
cess Clause is overworked. Too often we use it when there may be
better mechanisms at hand. To begin with, the text speaks of pro-
cess, not substance, and it is difficult to cram a shadow substantive
vision into it, although it can be done. Once you do cram a substan-
tive vision into it, you run the risk that the vision will be unbounded.
I think I heard, in Professor Nagel's remarks at this conference, some
concerns about the unboundedness of certain constitutional visions.6
Furthermore, historically the Due Process Clause goes back to the
3 See Edelman, supra note 2.
, • 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
• See, e,g., Thomas C. Grey, Procedural Fairness and Substantive Rights, 18 NOMOS 182
(1977). .
• See Robert F. Nagel, Unfocused Governmental Interests, 55 ALB. L, REV, 573 (1992).
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Fifth Amendment; the clause is not really redistributive, but rather
tied with Professor Radin's analysis of its companion clause, the Tak-
ings Clause in the Fifth Amendment.7 Originally, these clauses em-
bodied a kind of "stand-patism": protect what you have, do_·not
change the rules of the game (the existing property rules), and do not
redistribute. So I am not sure that the Due Process Clause is the best
vehicle to accomplish any kind of redistributive vision that is being
proposed.
We could, alternatively, focus upon the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Here, Professor Michelman's work is
very suggestive.8 Once again, however, I think there are some
problems with using equal protection as the vehicle for this vision of
minimal entitlements. To begin with, the doctrine has developed in a
manner such that we really do not take the word "protection" seri-
ously. Instead, we tend to reduce the Equal Protection Clause to
equal treatment by government of, for example, criminal defendants.
But, it is a little more difficult for us to take seriously the idea that
the government might have to affirmatively protect its citizens. Here,
we hear again the echoes of the affirmative/negative distinction com-
ing back in. The courts have been hesitant to see that the govern-
ment may have an affirmative obligation to act (for example, to pro-
tect citizens from murder or poverty). It is much easier, for example
in McCleskey v. Kemp,9 for the Court to at least look at racial dis-
crimination among criminal defendants than to see racial discrimina-
tion among the victims of crime because we have reduced equal pro-
tection to equal treatment.
Equal protection was originally supposed to have a much more
substantive bite. I think this is simply undeniable for anyone who has
read, for example, Professor ten Broek's work on the Equal Protec-
tion Clause and its historical roots. 10 Even if we take the word "pro-
tection" seriously, however, we still have this word "equal" that, I
think, is problematic for a minimal entitlements vision. The language
of "equal protection" seems to suggest more the idea of equal prop-
erty allocations, if we are going to apply it to property, rather than
some minimal stake in society. As a result, I am not sure that it is
the best vehicle. If I had to pick words in the Fourteenth Amend-.
7 See Margaret J. Radin, Evaluating Government Reasons for Changing Property Regimes,
55 ALB. L. REV. 597 (1992).
• See Frank 1. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
• 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
'. See JACOBUS TEN BROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (New enl. ed. 1965).
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ment to do the work, I would probably select the first sentence about
citizenship-that all persons born in the United States are citizens of
the United Statesll-and try to take seriously what that means, once
they are in the club, and especially once the Fifteenth Amendment
and the Twenty-fourth Amendment make them voters.
I want to suggest to you that we have disregarded one of the most
radical and/or progressive provisions of the Constitution, the Thir-
teenth Amendment, which is, of course, about getting rid of slavery.
Much more than that, however, it is about empowering people and
ensuring freedom. Its text is about substance, not procedure (unlike
the Due Process Clause). It has no state action requirement, which is
what all of us have been knocking up against in different ways. The
amendment is about positive and not just negative liberty, and ulti-
mately about, as I said, forty acres and a mule-which is the vision,
when you look beyond its text to the historical context, that is inspir-
ing the Thirteenth Amendment. This idea of forty acres and a mule,
of freedom and nonslavery, is an idea that is much more naturally
suggestive of minimal property shares than equal property shares.
The idea that we would just have to take all the money in America
and divide it up equally is a political nonstarter and enables someone
like Judge Posner to talk, perhaps too glibly, about socialism. I think
the better way for us to talk and think about the idea of minimal
entitlements (and this is my research suggestion for those of you who
want to try to develop a progressive agenda for minimal entitle-
ments) is to pay more attention to the Thirteenth Amendment. It is
a much richer provision than we have acknowledged. It is also, of
course,' redistributive. We should be proud of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. It is a revolutionary provision aimed at transforming society by
taking property that happens to be maldistributed (without any com-
pensation for slaveholders because the initial legal property alloca-
tions were considered unjust) and redistributing it in pursuit of a
more just ideal. It is a modification of the Takings Clause in some
important degree, rather than a r~affirmation of its "stand-patism"
about existing legal property rights. The argument might of course
be, "well, the old rules of legal property were never just in the first
place," but that is indeed the very claim that many contemporary'
redistributionists are making about the current legal property regime.
11 "All persons born or naturalized in the United States are subject to the jurisdiction
ther~of, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
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That is why I think we should pay a lot more attention to the Thir-
teenth Amendment.
What I ,Would now like to do is take seriously the linkage, which is
very clearly in Dean Edelman's paper, between children and pov-
erty.12 Dean Edelman is talking about poverty, and he reminds us
that many of the impoverished are children. You cannot really blame
them for their. plight, and if we are truly serious about poverty we
must be serious about children. What I want to suggest is that the
impoverishment of children cannot be understood only in financial
terms, but that they are impoverished by violence, which is often
visited upon them in the form of child abuse. Once again, affirmative
government intervention may be compelled just as affirmative inter-
vention on the property side may be compelled. Not surprisingly, I
believe that the Thirteenth Amendment is helpful in at least begin-
ning the conversation.
Indisputedly, the amendment was designed to end American en-
slavement of children as well as adults. A mulatto slave child sired by
a white slave owner was no less entitled to personal freedom under
the amendment. Under slavery, in the antebellum South, biology
often failed to protect the master's genetic offspring from the harsh
conditions of servitude. Many slaves were the biological children of
their masters. Nor did the amendment protect only those slaves with
some biological roots in Africa, for it also abolished the enslavement
of all persons regardless of their race or national origin. Finally, the
amendment guaranteed personal freedom in all respects, not only
freedom from forced labor. The amendment speaks to the actual en-
slavement of a person regardless of whether the ultimate motive for
such domination is greed, sadism, or power-lust. By its terms, there-
fore, the Thirteenth Amendment extends its affirmative protection to
a slave even if (1) the slave is a child; (2) the slave-child is the off-
spring of the master; (3) the slave-child has no African roots; and (4)
the slave-child is not used to maximize the master's financial profit.
One such slave-child, I submit, was Joshua DeShaney.
In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Ser-
vices/ 3 the Supreme Court held that the State of Wisconsin had no
constitutional duty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to protect a young child from his father's physical abuse.
The facts, of course, are heart-wrenching. During his first four years
of life, Joshua DeShaney suffered repeated beatings at the hands of
.. See Edelman, supra note 2.
,. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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hi~ father, resulting in severe brain damage. During these years,
Joshua remained in his father's custody even though Wisconsin's De-
partment of Social Services had strong reason to believe that he was
being abused.
In January of 1983, Joshua was temporarily removed from his fa-
ther's custody, but a juvenile court of Wisconsin soon returned him
to his father. Caseworkers were involved for a long time; they noted
the abuse but did nothing about it. Finally, a few weeks before his
fifth birthday in 1984, Joshua suffered a final and savage beating re-
sulting in severe brain damage and leaving him, basically, profoundly
retarded. He and his birth mother brought suit against Wisconsin for
its failure to remove him from his father's custody.
The Supreme Court denied Joshua's claim, and it did so following
very self-consciously, in my view, the lead of the Seventh Circuit
opinion below, written by Judge Posnerl(-who, by the way, keeps
turning up (like a bad penny) in our discussions here. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, explained ,that the Department of
Social Services has no duty to act because the Due Process Clause
does not impose an affirmative obligation on the state to ensure that
a person's interest in safety does not get violated through private
means. The Court distinguished Joshua's situation from cases like
Youngberg v. Romeo,H, which, said the Court,stood
only for the proposition that when the State takes a person
into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Con-
stitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume
some responsibility for his safety and general well-being....
[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its powers so
restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to
care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his
basic human needs-e.g., food, clothing, shelter"medical care,
and reasonable safety-it transgresses the substantive limits
on state action set by the Eighth Amendment and the Due
Process Clause.16
The DeShaney Court's narrow application of Youngberg, in my
mind, reflects obvious concerns about affirmative rights. We see from
Dean Edelman's discussion,17 and we clearly saw in DeShaney be-
.4 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987),
aff'd, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
10 See 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
•6 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200 (citations omitted).
17 Edelman, supra note 2 (Dean Edelman discussing Judge Posner's comments regarding ju-
dicially mandated minimal entitlements).
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low,t8 concern for the parade of horribles that would emerge if the
government were responsible every time a private crime were com-
mitted: victims of crimes suing the government for inadequate police
services, victims of fire suing the government for inadequate fire ser-
vices, victims of poverty suing the government for inadequate social
services, and so on. So the Court rejects the claim by playing the
affirmative rights, negative rights, no-state-action game.
Joshua DeShaney's mother did not assert a Thirteenth Amend-
ment claim. Consider, however, Justice Blackmun's statements in
DeShaney. In his passionate dissent, he set the stage for such a claim
when he compared the majority in DeShaney to "the antebellum
judges who denied relief to fugitive slaves."19 At this moment I can
only sketch out the analogy preliminarily. But do consider the anal-
ogy between antebellum slavery and child abuse, an analogy that Jus-
tice Blackmun's language, I think, suggests but does not really de-
velop. Abused children suffer the same treatment as slaves in one
important respect. Both are subject to the unconstrained power of
another person, and it is the evil of this unconstrained power, rather
than just economic motivation, that, in my view at least, animates
the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of slavery and involuntary
servitude. Unless the state acts to protect an abused child, the status
of the child closely parallels the status of pre-Civil War American
slaves. For example, if the child runs away, the state will return the
child to the parent's custody just as antebellum judges returned fugi-
tive slaves to their masters. In general, the Thirteenth Amendment is
not violated by parental custody because it ,is assumed that the
parent exercises control over the child in that child's interest. When
a parent perverts this coercive authority by systematically abusing
his ward (the child), however, he violates the Thirteenth Amendment
and is subject to suit.
Whereas the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to state conduct,
the Thirteenth Amendment applies to private conduct as well. It
does not have the state action requirement. It has more drastic impli-
cations, however, than simply allowing the ward to bring suit against
the master. The government itself is liable for its inaction if it fails to
protect the child from further abuse once it has constructive knowl-
edge of such abuse. Because of the state's role in ensuring parental
custody in the first place, the Thirteenth Amendment imposes upon
18 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987),
aff'd, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
18 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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~he state an affirmative duty to monitor this custody-that is, to en-
act and enforce child abuse laws.
This affirmative obligation, however, would not unleash the parade
of horribles that troubled the DeShaney Court. Unlike a due process
claim, a claim that the Thirteenth Amendment imposes this constitu-
tional obligation would not expose the state to legal action for every
private wrong. It would not, for example, apply in a case of someone
being mugged when the police were not around to prevent the mug-
ging. The Thirteenth Amendment, in such a case, is not really appli-
cable, and that was part of the concern of both Judge Posner and the
Supreme Court.
I hav~ some analysis of the text and the history of the Thirteenth
Amendment that I think confirms a lot of this. It is pretty clear, for
example, that the framers were thinking about people in general, not
just African-Americans. It is pretty clear they were also concerned
about Mexican peonage· and Chinese coolie labor systems, and even
white slavery. It is pretty clear that they were concerned about pro-
tecting those who were the biological offspring of their masters.
Frederick Douglass, for example, one of the most famous slaves, was
generally reputed to have been' the biological child of his master.
This paternal relationship, however, did not help him very much, and
he says so explicitly in his autobiography. Defenders of slavery analo-
gized slavery to servitudes: of wives to husbands, children to parents,
apprentices to masters, and wards to guardians. They, in fact, explic-
itly proposed an exception to the involuntary servitude ban, not just
for crimes, which stayed in the amendment, but for all family servi-
tudes. Those exceptions were rejected. The Republicans actually
thought that slavery was, in important respects, very much like po-
lygamy since they understood that, with this amendment, they were
dealing not just with economic relationships, but social relationships
within the private sphere. They were restructuring not just property
schemes or an economic system.
It is really striking when you read slave narratives of what slavery
was like. Slavery through slaves' eyes is not described as just an eco-
nomic system of exploitation, but is described as a system of domina-
tion, degradation, abuse, humiliation, and being subjected to the to-
tal power and whim of another human being. These narratives, when
you look at them in diaries and the like, are interchangeable with
narratives of abused children today. It is really quite striking just to
put them side by side, and.I think you can see the same evil in both.
So there is this kind of narrative analogy from the bottom up. There
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is the legal analogy of rendition of child runaways, just like fugitive
slaves.
Finally, however, there is a competing analogy. This analogy is one
of family rather than slavery. The definition of slavery as total con-
trol of one human being by another might, without further qualifica-
tions, seem to liberate children from parental custody at birth. To
some extent, the Thirteenth Amendment was designed to protect
black families from being undermined and ripped asunder by slavery.
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Robertson u. Baldwin,20 which is a
turn-of-the-century case, actually seems to create in passing an ex-
ception to "rights of parents and guardians to the custody of their
minor children or wards."21 This right, the Court implied, was well
established at the time of the Thirteenth Amendment, and it was not
meant to be eliminated by it. In cases of abused children, however, it
seems to me that this dictum does not really have any applicability.
We cannot just be fooled by nominalism: just because the father calls
it a family rather than slavery, that does not make it so. What we
really have here is a categorization/classification kind of issue. But
when custody ceases to be plausibly in the interest of the child, it
looks a lot more like true slavery than true family. In extraordinary
cases, such as severe physical abuse, custody cannot be justified in
terms of the child's interest.
The tough question, of course, is where to draw.the line. It is ex-
actly here that Professor Gottlieb's judo analogy22 is perfectly rele-
vant. We already draw the line. We draw it all the time. We draw it
in child abuse laws. We have so much confidence that we can sepa-
rate true abuse (where the state should intervene) from true family
that we allow the state to put people in jail and deprive them of lib-
erty because there is a compelling interest that the state is asserting
as sovereign-as criminal law enforcer-in putting them behind bars.
All I am suggesting is that we could use some of those definitions. It
is not just a compelling interest sufficient to override a father's lib-
erty interest and put the father in jail, but a compelling interest that
requires affirmative government enforcement of those laws to protect
the Joshua DeShaneys of the world. So, it is exactly this kind of idea
that I suggest: taking the compelling interest image and flipping it
around and thinking about it in terms' of protecting people's rights.
10 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
u Id. at 282.
II See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests and Constitutional Dis-
course, 55 ALB. L. REV. 549 (1992).
